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In the Critique ofJudgement, Kant isolates aesthetics as an autono­
mous field of human experience and philosophical study by charac­
terizing the aesthetic judgement of the beautiful as a synthetic 
judgement based on no determinate concept and yet laying claim to 
a priori universal validity. Explicating the obligatory force of this 
judgement"of taste," he refers to the judgement as "demanding, 
requiring, exacting," and ,Iimputing" agreement. In Beauty Restored, 
Mothersill criticizes this imperative language as a misdirected at­
tempt to distinguish judgements of the beautiful from ordinary 
empirical judgements. 
Characterizing aesthetic judgements as "commands" is, she 
says, theoretically unattractive and untrue to phenomenological 
reflection. In particular, this peremptory view of the judgement of 
taste is inconsistent with the commonplace request for reasons in 
support of a judgement and denies the possibility of tentative judge­
ments of taste. She argues that aesthetic judgements of the beautiful 
are most aptly construed, not as "implicit commands/' but as asser­
tions concerning a genuine property of the object in question. I will 
argu,e that: (1) Kant's use of imperative language to describe the 
judgement of taste is an emphasis on the universal validity of the 
judgement as opposed to the merely personal validity of the judge­
ment of sense and is not primarily a distinction between the judge­
ment of taste and the ordinary empirical judgement. (2) Mothersill's 
characterization of the Kantian judgement of taste as a Ii command" 
is a misleading dramatization of the normative force of the aesthetic 
judgement which informs her therefore misplaced phenomenologi­
cal objections to Kant's text. (3) The primary distinction between the 
aesthetic judgement and the empirical judgement is not the extraor­
dinary normative dimension of the former but that, because the 
judgement of taste is not based on determinate concepts, there exist 
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no secure procedures for confirming the tru th of a judgement of taste. 
Because of this inherent difficulty, judgements of taste solicit agree­
mentand offer themselves as examples of potentially genuine judge­
mentsi the uncertainty of aesthetic confirmation necessitates the 
existence of aesthetic dialogue. (4) The Kantian portrait of the 
judgement of taste as soliciting agreement to a universally valid 
claim not only allows but depends on the request for reasons and the 
possibility of tentative aesthetic judgements. 
Summary of the Deduction of the Judgement of Taste. Kant distin­
guishes the aesthetic judgement of sense from the aesthetic judge­
ment of taste. The former may be infl uenced by personal interest and 
emotion and declares an object to be agreeable, while the latter is free 
of these impure influences and declares an object to be beautiful. In 
contrast with cognitive judgements, whether theoretical or practical, 
the aesthetic judgementof taste is not based on a determinate concept 
of the object of judgement. With this preliminary characterization, 
Kant deduces, as he did in the first two Critiques for theoretical and 
practical judgements, a principle grounding the universal validity of 
the genuine judgement of taste. Because the judgement of taste is 
based on neither personal interest nor a concept of the object, it has 
reference only to the mere form of the object, what Kant calls the 
"subjective purposiveness of the presentation of the object". Because 
it is a formal judgement, the judgement of taste is located in the free 
play of the cognitive facul ties of the imagina tion and understanding; 
the obscure notion of free play records, among other properties, that 
aesthetic presentations engage the cognitive faculties without being 
restricted by any particular rule of cognition. These cognitive 
faculties of imagination and understanding may be presupposed in 
everyone, and moreover presumed the same in everyone, because 
they are the basis for the communicability of all cognition. Therefore, 
the pure aesthetic judgement of taste, depending only on these 
communicable cognitive faculties, is universally communicable and 
lays claim to universal validity. Now to defend (1}-(4). 
(1) That the judgement of taste and the ordinary empirical judgement 
are alike in /Idemanding" and "requiring" agreement. Consider an 
ordinary empirical judgement: upon consideration, I announce that 
there is a telephone pole standing between us. You reply that it is 
rather a tree. I glance up to confirm my judgement and, confirmed, 
conclude that you have failed to consider the scene carefully or your 
eyesight is poor or you don't know what a "telephone pole" is or else 
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are teasing me. I am confident my judgement is true. Would I say 
that you should judge in agreement with me? There is no reason you 
need judge at all, but ifyou undertake to judge, to assert a fact about 
whatis the case, you are under obligation to doso properly. Whether 
the obligation is to judge truly or only to take appropriate measures 
to ensure that you are qualified to judge (look up, get glasses, buy a 
dictionary of roadside attractions), in either case, there are definite 
constraints on the conditions of your reply. If you ignore these 
obligations, you are not undertaking to judge but are playing a game, 
or stretching your vocal cords, or speaking in code. 
The aesthetic judgement appears to have a similar normative 
structure: when I judge that Ulysses' Gaze is a beautiful film, I am, 
according to both Kant and Mothersill, making a claim to truth or 
general validity.l You reply that it was ugly (worthless?); I watch it 
again and am quite convinced otherwise - I resolve to discuss it with 
you, butin the meantime may hypothesize that you fell asleep during 
the film or your eyesight is poor or you haven't read the Odyssey or 
are trying to upset me. Ought you to judge in agreement with me? 
Again, ifyouundertake to judge, you should do so properly, whether 
thatmeans judging truly, or making proper preparations to judge, or 
both. 
In her chapter "Kant: Three Avoidable Difficulties," Mothersill 
acknowledges that the normativity of the two judgements might be 
aligned in this way, but she says that Kant's repeated reference to 
Ii demand, requirement," and" implicit command" in the judgement 
of taste reflect his belief that "the claims of beauty are ... more 
peremptory than the claims of I fact.1II2 Consider the full length of a 
passage Mothersill quotes in this connection: 
Hence [a judgement of taste, which involves] this pleasure[,] 
is like any empirical judgement because it cannot proclaim 
objective necessity or lay claim to a priori validitYi but like any 
other empirical judgement, a judgement of taste claims only to 
be valid for everyone, and it is always possible for such a 
judgement to be valid for everyone despite its intrinsic con­
tingency. What is strange and different about a judgement of 
taste is only this: that what is to be connected with the 
presentation of the object is not an empirical concept but a 
feeling of pleasure (hence no concept at all), though, just as if 
it were apredicate connected with cognition of the object, this 
feeling is nevertheless to be required of everyone. A singular 
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empirical judgement, e.g., the judgement made by someone 
who perceives a mobile drop of water inarock crystal, rightly 
demands that anyone else must concur with its finding, be­
cause the judgement was made in accordance with the uni­
versal conditions of the determinative power of judgement 
under the laws of a possible experience in general. In the same 
way, someone who feels pleasure in the mere reflection onthe 
form of an object, without any concern about a concept, 
rightly lays claim to everyone's assent, even though this judge­
ment is empirical and a singular judgement.3 [emphasis 
added] 
Kant emphasizes that the judgement of taste has, despite its 
intrinsic subjectivity, a claim to universal validity; in doing so, he 
repeatedly stresses the similarity between the normative structure of 
the judgement of taste and the ordinary empirical judgement. He 
repeatedly applies the same imperative language of IIclaiming", 
/I demanding", and ILrequiring" to both types of judgement. Presum­
ably Kant does not believe the ordinary empirical judgement is 
particularly "peremptory" in its claim to general validity; therefore 
his description of the"demand" and "requirement" implicit in the 
judgement of taste is not meant to highlight an especially strong 
normative dimension to that judgement. Throughout the Critique 
Kant's use of imperative language contrasts the judgement of taste 
with the judgement of sense by emphasizing the universal validity of 
the former, and is not meant primarily to distinguish judgements of 
taste from ordinary empirical judgements. For example: 
In making a judgement of taste (about the beautiful) we 
require everyone to like the object, yet without this liking's 
being based on a concept ... and that this claim to universal 
validity belongs so essentially to a judgement by which we 
declare something to be beautiful that it would not occur to 
anyone to use this term without thinking of universal valid­
ity; instead, everyth.ing we like without a concept would then be 
included with the agreeable.4 [emphasis added] 
For although the principle [grounding the judgement of 
taste] is only subjective, it would still be assumed as subjec­
tively universal (an idea necessary for everyone); and so it 
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could, like an objective principle, demand universal assent...5 
[emphasis added] 
The frequency and strengthofKant' s imperative language records 
his consciousness of the counter-intuitive nature of deducing the 
universal validity of a subjective, non-conceptual judgement. Let us 
proceed directly to the most extreme imperatives which Mothersill 
takes as evidence for Kant's" peremptory" stance. 
(2) ThatMothersill's characterization ofthe Kantian judgemen toftaste 
as a "command" is misleading; that her phenomenological objections are 
misplaced. Mothersill suggests that Kant focuses on the "demand" 
and "requirement" implicit in the judgement of taste in order to 
distinguish it from a mere fact or assertion: 
It is, in other words, the normative aspect of the judgementof 
taste that is not captured by the analysis that would entitle us 
to say that at least some judgements of taste are' true'. And 
it is with a view to supplying the lack that Kant says that in 
judging something beautiful, I'exact' (or demand orrequire) 
that everyone else find the object a cause of pleasure.6 
Why Kant does not permit the application of the predicate II true" 
to judgements of taste is a topic for careful consideration, but 
whatever the eventual answer, his imperative characteriza tion of the 
judgement of taste is not undertaken in an attempt to supply any 
extTaordinary normative dimension that might not be captured by a 
more conservative description. As suggested in section (1), the 
II demand" and "requirement" emphasize the universal validity of 
the judgement of taste, and confirm the status of the aesthetic 
judgement alongside other forms of general assertion. 
Mothersill proceeds with her discussion of Kant's supposedly 
peremptory concerns by quoting from the"General Comment on the 
Exposition of the Reflective Aesthetic Judgement"; to my knowledge 
this is the only passage of Kane s that she quotes containing the word 
"command", and moreover this is the only passage of which I am 
aware in the entire first division of the Critique in which"command" 
is used in association with the judgement of taste; in particular I do 
not find the word in the Analytic of the Beautiful or in the Deduction 
of Pure Aesthetic Judgements: 
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We can never arrive at such a principle [to ground the 
judgement of taste] by scouting about for empirical laws 
about mental changes. For these reveal only how we dci 
judge; they do not give us a command as to how we ought to 
judge, let alone an unconditioned one. And yet judgements 
of taste presuppose such a command, because they insist that 
our liking becormected directly with a presentation? 
It is a striking miSinterpretation to presume from this passage 
that judgements of taste are commands or imply commands. "Com­
mand" is here used as a substitute for "principle"; the focus of the 
passage is Kant's argument that empirical studies of our taste can 
never ground an unconditioned principle which would serve as a 
basis for the universal validity of the judgement of taste. Universal 
validity is a logical feature of the judgement of taste and therefore the 
judgement of taste presupposes such a principle as a condition of 
existence; without it, all aesthetic judgements would be mere judge­
ments of sense. Because there is no explicit evidence that Kant views 
the judgement of taste as a command per se, I presume Mothersill 
reads the Kantian 1/ demand" or IIrequirement" as synonymous with 
an implicit "command" and that this association informs her phe­
nomenological objections to Kant's position.s 
Mothersill's primary criticism of Kant's discussion depends on a 
dictatorial interpretation of the obligation implicit in the judgement 
of taste: 
I spoke earlier about the difficulties of making sense of the 
command, "Be pleased by 0." Some of these are mitigated 
if the thought is recast in the third person as "Let everyone be 
pleased by 0," or "Everyone ought to be pleased by 0." We 
might then imagine Kant as holding that just as the judge­
mentof taste (speech act) implicates 110 pleases me", soitalso 
implicates "Everyone ought to be pleased by 0." But is this 
the case? The only test is to appeal to reflective conscious­
ness, and though the former claim passes the test, the latter (it 
seems to me) does not. In putting forth my primary judge­
ment, I make a claim on behalf of the object, a claim to the 
effectthatit has a special sort of power. But! do not recognize 
the intention to issue an order or afiat, nor is a concern with 
what other people ought to think a conscious (still less a 
dominant) element of what I mean to convey.9 
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However close Kant's" claim to general validity" is to Mothersill' s 
interpreted "implicit command," it is unquestionably not a "Hat" 
and nowhere does Kant suggest that the"dominant" element of a 
judgement of taste is a "concern with what other people ought to 
think." The claim is a logical feature of the judgement and is, if 
anything, prior to intentional meaning. 
Nevertheless, Mothersill's characterization of the statements "Be 
pleased by 0" and "Let everyone be pleased by 0" as odd and 
unnatural is accurate. In this connection she quotes Kant, from 
Section 38, saying "we must be entitled to require this pleasure from 
everyone." But her focus on pleasure is an artifact of another confu­
sion: near the beginning of the Critique, in Section 9, Kant indicates 
that the pleasure resulting from a beautiful object follows the judge­
ment of taste as its consequence: liltmust be the universal communi­
cability of the mental state, in the given presentation, which under­
lies the judgement of taste as its subjective condition, and the 
pleasure in the object mustbe its consequence."10 Thus,by Section 38, 
when Kant speaks of "requir[ing] pleasure from everyone," he is 
substituting a consequentin place of the direct requirement: Irequire 
that everyone assent to my judgement and thereby experience the 
associated pleasure. Kant footnotes this line, which is the only line 
in the section referring to pleasure, with the immediate clarification 
that the phrase "require this pleasure" refers to "laying claim to 
universal assent to a judgement of the aesthetic power of judge­
ment.flll In short, objecting to the Kantian judgement of taste as 
implying the questionable imperatives "Be pleased by 0" and "Let 
everyone be pleased by 0" is a mistake. Even were we to accept that 
Kant's judgement of taste entails a strong implicit command, the 
statements "Judge in accord with pit or "Let everyone judge pI! are 
neither odd nor unnatural, but quite common. 
(3) That the judgement of taste is different from the ordinary empirical 
judgement, not in its imperative claim to universal validity, but in having 
no determinate testing procedures; explication of the exentplm' model. We 
have focused on the similarities Kant establishes between the norma­
tive structure of the genuine judgement of taste and the ordinary 
empirical judgement. But the aesthetic judgement is not based on a 
determinate concept of the object of judgement, as is the ordinary 
empirical judgement, and this imposes a strong condition on the 
proper application of the power of aesthetic judgement. 1£, uninten­
tionally, I issue an aesthetic judgement based on a concept of the 
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object, I may have given a practical or theoretical judgement or 
uttereda judgementof sense, but! will nothave succeeded in making 
a genuine judgement of taste. Kant describes other hazards which 
may befall a judgement of the beautiful: if it is tainted by personal 
interest, or is based in anemotional response or in the mere"charms" 
of the object, the abortive judgement of taste will become a judge­
ment of sense or a practical judgement. If these various conditions of 
felicity are met, the power of aesthetic judgement is properly em­
ployed and the resulting judgement will be universally valid. In this 
case, Kant says, the judgementhas been 1/ correctly subsumed under 
the principle of subjective universal validity" . 
If the aesthetic judgement was based on a determinate concept, 
there would exist rules or procedures, given by the concept, for 
determining whether the power of judgement has been properly 
employed. For example, if I praise this painting of a woodpecker 
because the woodpecker painting market is on the rise, which Kant 
calls judging according to the concept of utility, you could determine 
whether the woodpecker painting market is, in fact, on the rise, and 
whether this is, in fact, a painting of a woodpecker and thus worthy 
of my accolade; alternately, were I to praise the painting because it is 
an excellent representation of a woodpecker, which Kant calls judg­
ing according to the concept of perfection, you could conjure a 
woodpecker and compare ("But woodpeckers don't have green 
feet!"). Ordinary empirical judgements are based on concepts of the 
objects involved; therefore, when I judge that there is a raven in the 
belfry, you may go up to the belfry and trap all the birds and see 
whether any of them match the concept "raven." Kant's judgement 
of taste is never based on a determinate concept, and therefore no 
such procedure exists for aesthetic judgements. That the difficulty of 
confirming the proper application of the power of aesthetic judge­
ment in no way undermines the universal validity of the genuine 
judgement, Kant indicates in numerous passages: 
Beauty is not a concept of an object, and a judgement of taste 
is not a cognitive judgement. All it asserts is that we are 
justified in presupposing universally in all people the same 
subjective conditions of the power of judgement that we find 
in ourselves; apart from this it asserts only that we have 
subsumed the given object correctly under these conditions. 
It is true that this latter assertion involves unavoidable dif£i­
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culties that do not attach to the logical power of the judge­
ment (since there we subsume under concepts, whereas in 
the aesthetic power of judgement we subsume under a rela­
tion of the imagination and understanding, as they harmo­
nize with each other in the presented from of an object, that 
can only be sensed, so that the subsumption may easily be 
illusory) .... For as far as the difficulty and doubt concerning 
the correctness of the subsumption under that principle is 
concerned, no more doubt is cast on the legitimacy of the 
claim that aesthetic judgements as such have this validity 
(and hence is cast on the principle itself), than is cast on the 
principle of the logical power of judgement (a principle that 
is objective) by the fact that [sometimes] (though not so often 
and so easily) this power's subsumption under its principle 
is faulty as well.12 
If this difficulty of confirmation is extreme, if we can find no 
method for confirming aesthetic judgements, how is the lengthy 
deduction which determined the universal validity of genuinejudge­
ments other than otiose? 
Thoughhe does not describe the connection explicitly, Kant hints 
that aesthetic discussion provides a method for confirmation of 
judgements of taste in the absence of explicit testing procedures, and 
in his /I Aesthetic Problems of Modern. Philosophy," Cavell elabo­
rates this possibility. Consider two passages in which Kant mentions 
the difficulty of aesthetic verification: 
Hence the ought in an aesthetic judgement, even once we 
have all the data needed for judging, is still uttered only 
conditionally. We solicit everyone else's assent because we 
have a basis for it that is common to all. Indeed, we could 
count on that assent, if only we could always be sure that the 
instance had been subsumed correctly under that basis, 
which is the rule for theapprovalP [emphasis added] 
Whenever we make a judgement declaring something to be 
beautiful, we permit no one to hold a different opinion, even 
though we base our judgement only on our feeling rather 
than on concepts; hence we regard this underlying feeling as 
a common rather than as a private feeling. ... Hence the 
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commonsense, of whose judgement I am at that point offering 
my judgement of taste as an example, attributing to it exemplary 
validity on that account, is a mere ideal standard .... [this 
judgement] could, like an objective principle, demand uni­
versal assent insofar as agreement among different judging 
persons is concerned, provided only we ,,,ere certain that we 
had subsumed under it correctly.14 [emphasis added] 
Because I am never certain of the proper application of my own 
power of aesthetic judgement, when making judgements of taste I 
"solidt" agreement from all others and 1/offer" my judgement"as an 
example" of the common, genuine judgement. As Cavell says, in 
making an aesthetic judgement, 1 tum to the other "not to convince 
himwithout proof but to get him to prove something, test something, 
against himself. [1 am] saying: Look and find out whetheryoucansee 
what I see, wish to say what I wish to say."1S If together, in aesthetic 
dialoguel we can find a judgement in common, an understandingwe 
can agree upon, we assert it as valid and hold to it until another 
person comes to question us or until we decide to question one 
another again. Thus, we might saYI dialectic is the main instrument 
for the acquisition of aesthetic knowledge; because of the conditional 
inherent in the judgement of taste, the other holds a hallowed place 
in our aesthetic lives. 
(4) That the Kantian model ofaesthetic judgement as soliciting ~gree­
ment to a universally valid claim admits the request for reasons and 
tentative judgements. Mothersill motivates the supposed Kantian 
command by saying, liThe advantage (it might seem) of a command 
is that provided you have the requisite authority, the request for 
reasonsisoutoforder" (16). Immediatelyfollowingthis,shecounters, 
/I as a matter of fact, the request for reasons is not out of order." As we 
have seen, Kant's judgement of taste lays claim to general validity 
only on the implicit condition that it is genuine, and the confirmation 
of that condition is always uncertain. There is ample room in the 
process of confirmation for the request for reasons and, in factI the 
process depends on that request. The "requirement" of agreement 
which appears to threaten this openness to questioning is a logical 
feature of the judgement, as the claim to universal validity is a logical 
feature of an ordinary empirical judgement. WhenI assert that there 
is a owl in the bam, I expect you to agree, but that never precludes 
you asking how it is 1know. 
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Mothersill raises a related objection concerning the categoricality 
of the judgement of taste, namely, that Kant's judgement of taste 
could not be tentative. She says: 
The security I feel in those of my primary judgements which 
cluster at one end of a spectrum .,. Kant wants to construe as 
a logical feature of the judgement of taste itself. It is as if no 
one ever made a tentative appraisal or was ever persuaded 
that he had made a mistake. An opinion can be venrured, 
floated for discussion, modified over time, revised, aban­
doned, but it is not clear, nor does Kant explain how such 
modalities are construed on the view that makes the judg­
ment of taste a 'command' which is 'unconditioned' and 
which extracts a 'necessary universal delight' P 
Another conflict born of her reading of Kant: that a judgement of 
taste lays claim to universal validity is a logical feature of the 
judgement and is the condition of the existence of such judgements. 
Without it, they would be mere judgements of sense. Mothersill 
would be the first to agree that when I venture that a film is good, I 
am being tentative about the accuracy of the claim, butnotin the least 
about the categorical implications of the judgement if true. If con­
firmed, my judgement is, as Mothersill would put it, a claim that the 
object itself has a power that is valid for everyone. Ordinary 
empirical judgements again provide a model. When I say, flI suspect 
there is a grouse in the pantry," I await confirrnationor disconfirmation 
of my claim ("Get a flashlight!"), but all the while the claim concerns 
a grouse in the pantryfor me andfor you and for anyone else who cares 
to look. 
When Mothersill reconsiders Kant's Critique in Chapter XI, she 
acknowledges more explicitly that Kant is aware of the contingencies 
inherent in the power of aesthetic judgement and she refers to a 
number of the passages quoted above that indicate Kant's position is 
not so far removed from her own. She says, "I argued earlier that if 
Kant were willing (as he sometimes seems to be) to weaken the 
notion of what we'demand' of everyone and allow that the'ought' 
of the judgement of taste is to be construed as a subjunctive, he would 
have come very close to the truth."1S The extent of the difference 
between Kant's position, as it stands, and Mothersill's revision is, as 
I hope I have shown, a matter for more careful consideration; 
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perhaps Kant's emphasis onthe"demand" implicit in the judgement 
of taste is not intended with the dictatorial force Mothersill reads in 
it. Nevertheless, Mothersill reiterates a remaining objection to Kant's 
characterization of the conditions on the truth of the judgement of 
taste: 
My quarrel with Kant, as suggested earlier, is thathe presents 
a conceptual daim in such a way as to suggest that the task of 
a critic, that is, someone who wants to communicate, test, and 
consolidate his findings, is largely introspective ",19 
She goes on to say, with reference to her imagined perplexity at 
finding a brush-and-ink scroll beautiful, " An investigation (if I care 
to undertake one) will focus not on my inner life but ort the scroll I see 
before me."20 Kant's conditions on the proper application of the 
power of aesthetic judgement, namely that the judgement is made 
without a determinate concept and without reference to personal 
interest or emotion, are internal conditions. This characterization of 
the contingency in the judgementof taste appears to conflict with the 
phenomenological fact that we resolve doubts concerning the truth 
of aesthetic judgements by attention not to our mental or emotional 
state but to the object in question - confirmation is an external 
process, 
Aesthetic dialogue can, through mutual external scrutiny, con­
firm and facilitate the satisfaction of the internal conditions for 
genuine judgement. Consider an extreme example of aesthetic 
disagreement: I attest that my friend's novel is one of the best of the 
year, you respond that it is trash. Your denial of my judgement alone 
may be sufficient for me to reconsider; I reread the novel and 
discover that it is, in fact, trash - perhaps it occurs to me that my 
earlier judgement was biased, perhaps not; in either case, I have 
arrived at an unbiased, disinterested judgement through confronta­
tion with the judgement of another. Or again: you rave about The 
Brothers Karamazov, but your extended discussion of the intricacies 
and subtleties of Ivan's character leave me bewildered; I realize how 
strongly I identified with Alyosha and recognize that my love of the 
novel bears, not reconsideration, but refOCUSing. We are each prone 
to a different set of aesthetic failures; the variety of favorite subjects, 
personal biases, and emotional responses ensures that inconfronting 
another over an aesthetic judgement, I will have my prejudices and 
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confusions challenged, perhaps by other prejudices and equal confu­
sions but nevertheless in a mode which, if I am open to it, may move 
me toward a more honest evaluation of the work in question. 
NOTES 
1. It is worth noting that our paradigmatic examples of ordinary empirical 
judgements are specific statements, while examples of aesthetic judgements tend 
to be generic. Does this suggest that our aesthetic vocabulary is impoverished or 
that our real aesthetic judgements are embarrassing or betray a fantasy or 
confusion of our theoretical model~or does it reflect an inherent difference in the 
structure of the two judgements? 
2. Mary Mothersill, Beauty Restored. p. 215. 
3. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement. Trans. Werner S. Pluhar ak.191. All 
quotations are from Pluhar's translation. All section references are to the 
Akademie edition. 
4. ibid., 215. 
5. ibid., 239. I will not defend this point further. See section 6.211~2, s.7 entire, 
s.8.214, s.18.236, and s.20 entire. That Kant's imperative language distinguishes 
the judgement of taste from the judgement of sense and not from the ordinary 
empirical judgement is also evidenced in the quotations given in section (3) 
below. 
6. Mothel'sill, p. 214. 
7. Kant, 278. 
8. In any discussion where distinctions tum on apparent subtleties of word 
choice, we must be wary of confusions and artifacts of translation. For the 
purpose of this discussion, I can only take Pluhar's translation on faith; he does, 
however, specifically attest to the accuracy of rendering ansinnen and zumetel1 as 
"require" in footnote 26, p. 57. We may hope his other choices are as true to the 
original. 
9. Mothersill, p. 215. 
10. Kant, 217. 
11. ibid., 290. 
12. ibid., 290~1. 
13. ibid., 237. 
14. ibid., 239. 
15. Stanley Cavell/ /I Aesthetic Problems in Modem Philosophy" in Must We Mean 
What We Say?, p. 95-6. 
16. Mothersill, p. 217. 
17. ibid., 162. 
18. ibid., 328. 
19. ibid., 329. 
20. ibid., 330. 
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